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NOTES AND COMMENTS
when asked and not "looking backwards from the events that tran-.
spired" ;37 and (4) a witness being fully apprised of the way in which
the questions are pertinent. If the main emphasis of Watkins is not
placed on the requirement of explicit congressional authorization, then
that case tells us nothing new other than listing five ways by which a
witness may be informed of the subject under inquiry 38 The require-
ments of pertinency of questions to subject matter 9 and of pertinency
of subject matter to congressional authorization40 have long been de-
clared to be essential. To read the Watkins decision in any other light
removes from that case the vital impact the case was expected to have4 '
on the entire practice of congressional investigations. 42
JOEL L. FLEISnXAN
Constitutional Law-Double Jeopardy-Conviction of Murder in the
First Degree After Reversal of Conviction of Murder in the Second
Degree
In Green v. United States' .the petitioner had been indicted in the
District of Columbia for first degree murder. Upon a verdict of guilty
of murder in the second degree, he appealed and obtained a new trial.2
On remand he was again tried for first degree murder, and this time
convicted of that charge and sentenced to death. The United States
Supreme Court held that the second trial for first degree murder put
the petitioner in jeopardy twice for the same offense in violation of the
Federal Constitution.3
The reasoning of the Court was that the petitioner was not required
to -waive former jeopardy as to the charge of first degree murder in
order to have a new trial of his conviction for second degree murder.
The effect of this decision is that when an accused is tried for first degree
'
7 Ibid.
38 See note 18 supra.
"McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176 (1927).United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
"As Justice Clark says in his dissent in Watkins, "As I see it the chief fault
in the majority opinion is its mischievous curbing of the informing function of
the Congress." 354 U.S. at 217.
"Cf. United States v. Brewster, 154 F. Supp. 126 (D.C.D.C. 1957) (in con-
victing the President of Western Teamsters Conference for refusal to produce
union records subpoenaed by the Investigations Subcommittee of the Senate Gov-
ernment Operations Committee, the court sustained the Committee's power to see
the records in order to check the truthfulness of reports filed by the union with
the Department of Labor); Federal Communications Comm'n v. Cohn, 154 F.
Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (court held that the F.C.C. had been given sufficient
power by Congress to subpoena financial records of television finances in an in-
vestigation of radio and television networks).
1355 U.S. 184 (1957).
'218 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cr. 1955).
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides in part, "[N]or shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ... .
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murder, but is convicted only of second degree murder or manslaughter
and obtains a new trial, that trial must be limited to the offense of
which he was convicted in the first trial. A second trial of the higher
offense of first degree murder places him in double jeopardy.4
Although the cases are distinguishable, the Court had previously
reached the opposite conclusion in Trono v. United States,5 saying that
when a defendant at his own request "has obtained a new trial he must
take the burden with the benefit, and go back for a new trial of the whole
case." 6 This holding had been regarded as binding by the lower federal
courts.7
North Carolina has an interesting history regarding this question.8
Prior to 1948, there were eight instances in which a defendant in such
a situation appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court.9 In only one
of these, State v. Groves,'° was the appeal successful and a new trial
granted. In that case the defendant made no objection on the ground
of double jeopardy, and the court simply said, "The case goes back for
This fact situation must be distinguished from onre where the defendant has
been convicted of the same offense for which he was indicted. In the latter case
it is conceded that he waives his defense of former jeopardy if he is granted a new
trial. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). This situation must also be
distinguished from one where the defendant, charged under an indictment with
two or more counts, is only convicted on one count. In that case North Carolina
holds that if he is granted a new trial, he may be retried on all the counts. State
v. Beal; 202 N.C. 266, 162 S.E. 561 (1932). As to mutually exclusive counts, see
Note, 36 N.C.L. Rav. 84 (1957).
199 U.S. 521 (1905). The Tr6tio case arose in the Philippine Islands shortly
after they were annexed by the United States. On a charge of first degree murder
the defendants had been convicted of assault. They appealed to the Supreme
Court of the Philippines. That court, exercising the jurisdiction possessed by it
at the time, reversed the judgment of the trial court and convicted the defendants
of second degree murder.
Although the Green case does not expressly overrule Trono, but limits it to its
facts, certainly it overrules it in effect, for in the Trono opinion the Court said,
"We may regard the question as thus presented as the same as if it arose in one
of the Federal courts in this country .... " Id. at 530.
old. at 534.
Carbonell v. People of Porto- Rico; 27' F.2d 253 (1st Cir. 1928); United
States v. Gonzales, 206 Fed. 239' (W.D. Wash. 1913).
8 Although there is no express double jeopardy provision in the North Carolipa
Constitution, it is prohibited under the "law of the land" clause. N.C. CoNsT. art.
I, § 17, State v. Crocker, 239 N.C. 446, 80 S.E.2d 243 (1954).
'State v. Davis, 175 N.C. 723, 95 S.E. 48 (1918) ; State v. Matthews, 142 N.C.
621, 55 S.E. 342 (1906) ; State v. Gentry, 125 N.C. 733, 34 S.E. 706 (1899) ; State
v. Freeman, 122 N.C. 1012, 29 S.E. 94 (1898) ; State v. Groves, 121 N.C. 563, 28
S.E. 262 (1897); State v. Craine, 120 N.C. 601, 27 S.E. 72 (1897); State v.
Bridgers, 87 N.C. 562 (1882) ; State v. Grady, 83 N.C. 643 (1880). In connec-
tion with these cases it should be noted that in North Carolina it is not necessary
that the indictment specifically allege first degree murder in order that the accused
may be convicted of that offense. N.C. GmE. STAT. § 15-144 (1953), State v.
Kirksey, 227 N.C. 445, 42 S.E.2d 613 (1947). Rather, he is indicted for murder,
and the jury determines in its verdict whether it is in the first or second degree.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-172 (1953), State v. Bagley, 158 N.C. 608, 73 S.E. 995
(1912).
10121 N.C. 563, 28 S.E. 262 (1897).
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trial de novo for the offense charged in the bill of indictment."' 1  In
five of the seven cases in which the appeal was unsuccessful, the court
expressed the opinion by way of dicta that had a new trial been awarded,
the defendant could be lawfully convicted of first degree murder.12
Finally in 1948 the issue was for the first time put squarely before the
North Carolina court. In State v. Correll'3 the defendant had been con-
victed of manslaughter on an indictment for murder and had obtained
a new trial. In the second trial he was convicted of second degree
murder, and again he appealed, this time on the theory that he was
put in double jeopardy. Relying on assorted dicta in its previous cases
and the Groves case (in which the defendant had not raised the ques-
tion), the court said, "It appears . . . from former decisions of this
Court that it is an accepted principle of law in this State that when on
appeal by defendant from judgment on a verdict of guilty in a criminal
prosecution a new trial is ordered, the case goes back to be tried on the
bill of indictment as laid."'1 4 Thus there has evolved in North Carolina
a holding which is directly opposed to that of the Green case.15
There is no clear majority rule regarding the question presented
by the Green and Correll cases.' 6 One of the earliest decisions in-
1 Id. at 568, 28 S.E. at 264. The court relied on State v. Craine, 120 N.C. 601,
27 S.E. 72 (1897). In that case the defendant was not granted a new trial, but
there was dictum that had he been, it could have been for the greater offense.
" State v. Davis, 175 N.C. 723, 95 S.E. 48 '(1918) (concurring opinion) ; State
v. Matthews, 142 N.C. 621, 55 S.E. 342 (1906) ; State v. Gentry, 125 N.C. 733, 34
S.E. 706 (1899); State v. Freeman, 122 N.C. 1012, 29 S.E. 94 (1898); State v.
Craine, 120 N.C. 601, 27 S.E. 72 (1897).
13229 N.C. 640, 50 S.E.2d 717 (1948).1 Id. at 641, 50 S.E.2d at 718. The court cited State v. Matthews, 142 N.C.
621, 55 S.E. 342 (1906) ; State v. Gentry, 125 N.C. 733, 34 S.E. 706 (1899) ; State
v. Freeman, 122 N.C. 1012, 29 S.E. 94 (1898) ; State v. Craine, 120 N.C. 601, 27
S.E. 72 (1897). But in none of these was a new trial awarded. The court also
cited State v. Bridgers, 87 N.C. 562 (1882), and State v. Grady, 83 N.C. 643
(1880). In these two cases, not only was a new trial not granted but the court
expressly refused to state an opinion on this question. Finally, the court cited
State v. Beal, 202 N.C. 266, 162 S.E. 561 (1932), and State v. Stanton, 23 N.C.
424 (1841). These two cases involved the situation where a defendant, indicted on
several counts, is convicted on one or more but not all of them. Therefore they
are distinguishable. See note 4 stpra.
15 The Correll case was followed in State v. Chase, 231 N.C. 589, 58 S.E.2d
364 (1950).
"3 The opinion has been expressed that murder and manslaughter are different
crimes. In Weighorst v. State, 7 Md. 442 (1855), the court said, "Although both
are within the general term homicide, yet, legally speaking, they are not different
degrees of the same offense, because one is not murder at all ... ." Supra at 451.
The Maryland court seems to have missed the point. Homicide is not necessarily a
crime. It may be justifiable, Hammond v. State, 147 Ala. 79, 41 So. 761 (1906),
or excusable, Gill v. State, 134 Tenn. 591, 184 S.W. 864 (1916). The crime is
felonious homicide, and it may be either murder or manslaughter, People v. Austin,
221 Mich. 635, 192 N.W. 590 (1923), the difference being that malice is an essential
element for a killing to constitute murder, State v. Baldin, 152 N.C. 822, 68 S.E.
148 (1910). Blackstone put it, "Manslaughter (when voluntary) arises from the
sudden heat of the passions, murder from the wickedness of the heart." 4 Black-
stone, Commentaries *190.
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volving this problem was a Louisiana case decided in 1845.17 By dictum
that court took the view represented by the Green case; a year later a
federal court in United States v. Harding'8 took the side of the Correll
case. Thus the question was weaned on conflict, and the situation is no
different today. In at least sixteen states the holding of the Green case
prevails, 19 but another sixteen are in accord with North Carolina.20
Of all the decisions adopting the North Carolina rule, perhaps the
6lassic case is Brantley v. State.21 There the defendant contended that
the verdict in the first trial finding him guilty of manslaughter had the
Jegal effect of finding him not guilty of murder, and that therefore he
could not be tried for murder at the second trial without being put
in double jeopardy. The court said that one may waive his constitutional
protection against double jeopardy by obtaining a new trial, and that
in this situation the waiver is not limited to the offense for which he was
convicted, but extends to the entire offense for which he was indicted.
A verdict, the court said, is single, and the defendant cannot divide it
into that which favors him and that which does not. Had he allowed
it to ,stand, he,,could have claimed any legal results flowing from it,
including the implication that, as he..was only convicted of manslaughter,
he was not guilty of the higher offense of murder. But as the court
pointed out, once he causes the conviction to be set aside, the implica-
tion is left without a basis aild so nrust fail with the convictioA.22
State v. Hornsby, 8 Rob. 583, 41 Am. Dec. 314. (La. 1845).26 Fd. Cas. 131, No. 15301 "(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1846).19Rigbell v. .State, 8 Ala. Apjp. 46, 62 So. 977 (1913) ; Hearfi v. Stae, 212 Ark.
360, 205 S.W.2d 477 (1947) -.People v. Hulntifigton, 8 Cal. App. 612, 97 Pac. 760(1908) ; State v. Naylor, 28 Del. 99, 90 At. 880 (1913) * McLeod v. State, 128Fla. 35, 174 So. 466 (1957) ; People v. Newmah, 360 Ill. 226, 198 XE. 645 (193 ) ;
State v. Coleman, 226 Iowa 968, 285 N.W. 269 (1939) ; State v. Wooten, 136 La.
560, 67 So. 366 (1915) ; People v. Farrell, 146 Mich. 264, 109 N.W. 440 (1906) ;
State v. Welch, 37 N.M. 549, 25 P.2d 211 (1933) ; State v. Wilson, 172 Ore. 373,
142 P.2d 680 (1943) ; Commonwealth v. Deitrick, 221 Pa. 7, 70 At. 275 (1908) ;
Reagen v. State, 155 Tenn. 397, 293 S.W. 755 (1927); Taylor v. Commonwealth,
.186 Va. 587, 43 S.E.2d 906 (1947) ; State v. Foley, 131 W. Va. 326, 47 S.E.2d 40(1948) ; Radej v. State, 152 Wis. 503, 140 N.W. 21 (1913).
"oYoung v. People, 54 Colo. 293, 130 Pac. 1011 (1913) ; Brantley v. State, 132
Ga. 573, 64 S.E. 676 (1909) ; State v. Killigrew, 202 Ind. 397, 174 N.E. 808 (1931) ;
State v. Morrison, 67 Kan. 144, 72 Pac. 554 (1903) ; Hoskins v. Commonwealth,
152 Ky. 805, 154 S.W. 919 (1913); Jones v. State, 144 Miss. 52, 109 So. 265(1926) ; State v. Stallings, 334 Mo. 1, 64 S.W.2d 643 (1933) ; Pembroke v. State,
119 Neb. 417, 229 N.W. 271 (1930) ; State v. Teeter, 65 Nev. 584, 200 P.2d 657(1948) ; People v. McGrath, 202 N.Y. 445, 96 N.E. 92 (1911) ; State v. Robinson,
100 Ohio App. 466, 137 N.E.2d 141 (1956); Turner v. Territory, 15 Okla. 557,
82 Pac. 650 (1905) : State v. Gillis, 73 S.C. 318, 53 S.E. 487 (1906) ; State v.
Kessler, 15 Utah 142, 49 Pac. 293 (1897) ; State v. Bradley, 67 Vt. 465, 32 At.
238 (1895) ; State v. Hiatt, 187 Wash. 226, 60 P.2d 71 (1936).2 132 Ga. 573, 64 S.E. 676 (1909).22 There is another view which concurs in the result reached in the Brantley
case, but which is based on different reasoning. In a dissenting opinion, justice
Holmes said, "It seems to me that logically and rationally a man cannot be said
to be more than onc6 in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he may be
tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy from its beginning to the end
[Vol. 36
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In the Green case the Court said that if the waiver extends to the
whole offense for which the defendant was indicted, then he is faced with
a dilemma.23  In order to gain a chance to have corrected what he con-
siders an erroneous conviction of a lesser offense, he must run the risk
of conviction of an offense which may be punishable by death. This
gives him no meaningful choice. Accordingly, those decisions which are
in line with the Green case limit the extent of the waiver to the offense
of which he was convicted. He is deemed acquitted of any greater
offense by the first verdict.24
From the foregoing it is seen that there are two opposing camps
regarding the question presented by the Green case. The two are ap-
proximately equal in number and can possibly be equally well supported
by logical argument. The danger is that well reasoned logic may obscure
the point in conflict. Perhaps the answer to this problem is more a
matter of policy than of logic. Justice Holmes said that "in this country
there is more danger that criminals will escape justice than that they will
be subjected to tyranny."25 Yet, in the orderly administration of justice
that balance is likely as equal as laws can devise. It is therefore sub-
mitted that the holding of the Green case exemplifies the spirit, if not
clearly the letter, of the prohibition against double jeopardy.2
R.ICHARD C. CARMICHAEL, JR.
Criminal Law-Obstructing Justice-Interfering With a Police Officer
Statutes imposing criminal sanctions for obstructing justice' coritain
such descriptive words as obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, interfere,
hinder, prevent, intimidate and impede. The question raised is should
of the cause." Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904). No cases in
support of this theory have been found.
233 55 U.S. at 193.2
'Hearn v. State, 212 Ark. 360, 205 S.W.2d 477 (1947); Commonwealth v.
Deitrick, 221 Pa. 7, 70 AtI. 275 (1908).
" Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (dissenting opinion).
"The holding of the Green case will affect only the federal courts, as the
double jeopardy prohibition contained in the fifth amendment of the Federal
Constitution does not apply to the states. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319(1937). However, an interesting sidelight of the Green case is the fact that the
majority opinion was written by Justice Black, who has insisted that the four-
teenth amendment due process clause incorporates the entire Bill of Rights so as
to make its provisions binding on the states. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion). The majority of the Court has always refused
to accept this idea. For a discussion of the majority view, see Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinions in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 412 (1945),
and Adamson v. California, supra at 59.
'ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 402 (1940); Aliz. REv. STAT. ANt. § 13-541 (1956);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-1005 (Burns 1956); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 135, § 21(1954); MiNir. STAT. ANN. § 613.56 (1947); Nan. REv. STAT. § 28-729 (1948);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-223 (1953); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:99-1 (1953); TENN.
CoDE ANN. § 39-3104 (1955) ; W. VA. CODE; ANN. § 6015 (1955).
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